Hedging the house?
By Peter F. Way, CFA
Last letter (4/19/10): “The GS fraud case probably is not going to be a single-purpose or single-event action. We may hear more from the Feds at Justice, and certainly from the “plaintiff’s bar,” now notified that suits against one of the “deepest pockets” imaginable will provide an ongoing legal fee lottery for some time to come.”
As predicted, the legal piranhas are swarming to the class-action attack. Additionally, stories of criminal investigations circulate. In recognition, GS stock has been reclassified by S&P to Sell.
There are clear indications that Goldman Sachs knew as much as a week earlier that the suit was coming.
This provides an opportunity to illustrate just how well a transparent risk-evaluating market (like listed stock options) functions. The following picture is drawn from our related website, blockdesk.com, where we display how protection-derived price range forecasts for stocks evolve through time.
In the week before announcement of the SEC’s initial fraud complaint against Goldman Sachs, the public market in GS stock stood in denial, with prices even rising a bit further. (They are partly obscured awkwardly, by the data table in the upper right corner of the picture.)
But the better-informed options market anticipated what was to come, adjusting its prices to forecast (in red) a drop to at least the $160 area from $180, and perhaps to as little as $140.
At the complaint, GS prices closed in the upper $150’s after seeing intraday lows there each day. This Friday’s close took GS down to $145, with once-again lowered price projections.
Ironically, the GS options prices are dominated by the entire block trading and proprietary trading community, of which Goldman Sachs is the most influential member. But it is a market driven by risk-neutral arbitrage, where no one party in the community can control outcomes, as this makes evident.
Live by the sword, die by the sword.
Goldman Sachs, although seriously wounded, will not perish.
The principal issue in the financial reforms discussion remains the enforced legal separation of trading roles between agents and principals. Unless they are kept separate, conflicts of interest cannot be avoided.
This is what Glass-Steagall of yesteryear, and currently, “Volker rules” involve. The legal structures of former securities brokerage firms, now federally-insured “banks,” throws additional political conflicts of too-big-to-fail and risk-taking-with-insured-public-deposits into the mix. Common sense demands it all be unwound into separate firms that operate either as agents or principals, but not both.
The outcome ought to see a return to partnerships undertaking the proprietary trading role and the underwriting-dealer functions as principals, with corporations (possibly “banks” ?) acting as agents to facilitate trades. But both functions are essential and must be provided.
The firms that need to be so dismembered are putting up a defense that such action would drive those markets offshore, to the detriment of US employment and economic recovery. With so many countries abroad suffering from the world-wide market’s collapse, it is hard to conclude that there are many, if any, eager to be hosts for the possible future repeat of such atrocities. This is a pure red-herring defense.
A multi-trillion-dollar market functioning from Guernsey or the Caymans is not credible.
The complete lack of any clearing and performance-guaranteeing entity in the mortgage securities market induced the immoral and unrestrained behavior leading to that market’s collapse. Even Goldman Sachs admits that a clearing operation in mortgage-backed securities is essential, and offers its participation.
What is lacking further is a risk-insurance market that has standardization, transparency, and enforcement to provide liquidity in the MBS market. Needed is the function that is so well performed in equity markets by the Options Clearing Corporation.
The risk-mitigating vehicles attempted were Credit Default Swaps (CDS), but rather than being related directly to the CDO securities, they were between institutions on a private-deal basis, with no standardization, transparency, or evidence of enforceability.
From someone with little knowledge of the bond markets for MBS, it seems like what needs to occur is the evolution of well-defined standards and genuine ratings for the CDOs (with some legal recourse to the raters), and an options-like market based upon CDO market evaluations. Then this more specific put-your-money-where-your-concerns-are mechanism would act as the means of inducing liquidity into the market for MBS bonds, as well as ensuring ultimate responsibility of actions.


